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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~IORONI F. BOTT, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
A. ~1. REEBER, aka ADOLPH M. 
REEDER, and wife ADA M. REEDER, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
CAsE No. 9539 
The nature of the present case is an action brought 
by the purchaser of lands for specific performance and 
a counter claim by the Defendant vendors for the pur-
chase price, together with interest. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The disposition of the case made in the lower Court 
was that the Court granted specific performance to the 
vendee conditioned on his payment of the purchase price 
to Defendant vendors. 
EXACT NATURE OF TI-lE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Defendants-Appellants seek on appeal to recover 
interest at the legal rate on the balance of $2621.58 owed 
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them by the Plaintiff-Respondent for the purchase price 
of certain lands sold by Defendants-Appellants to Plain-
tiff-Respondent which balance was owing Defendants-
Appellants for a period from September 1943, to the time 
a deed was delivered to Plaintiff-Respondent in August 
of 1961. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In August of 1943 Defendant, A.M. Reeder, executed 
and delivered to Plaintiff a memorandum of an agreement 
to the effect that Defendant, A. M. Reeder agreed to sell 
to the Plaintiff a certain piece of property located in 
Section 34, Township 10 North, Range 3 West, SLB&M, 
in Box Elder County, Utah, for the purchase price of 
$4000 and to furnish an additional seven and one-half 
acres of fully paid up water right in the Utah Idaho Sugar 
Company. There was no dispute as to the purchase price, 
nor the furnishing of the additional water right, which 
~fr. Reeder did. 
It was further agreed by the parties at the time ~1r. 
Reeder delivered the memorandum to the Plaintiff that 
interest was not to be charged, according to Plaintiffs 
witness, until 90 days after tender of the deed ( T 34) 
Very material to the case is the fact that Defendants 
did not have title to the land in question at the time the 
memorandum was delivered to Plaintiff. Plaintiff ad-
mitted he knew the Defendants did not have title to the 
land at the time the sale agreement ':vas made ( T 21). 
Plaintiff and the Defendant, ~Ir. Reeder, both believed 
it would be only a very short while until title was cleared 
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( T 29). Further evidence of this belief was the testimony 
given by Mr. Christensen (T 35-36) that Mr. Bott, Jr. had 
applied for a loan to pay the purchase price during the 
same year the memorandum was delivered. 
Both parties were also aware that Geo. M. Mason, 
a practicing attorney, was handling the matter of clearing 
the title (T 30). 
There was no conflict that ~ilr. Bott, Jr. was to take 
possession immediately (T 30). Mr. Bott, Jr. testified 
that he did take right over ( T 23) and that he has been 
farming the property since that time, marketing the crops 
and enjoying the full benefits and use of the property. 
After the hearing of the testimony, the Court made 
two findings of fact: ( 1) that Reeder was to give, in 
effect, a warranty deed when he obtained a good title 
from Holleys ( T 41), and ( 2) that the parties agreed 
there was to be no interest until ninety days after Mr. 
Reeder tendered the deed ( T 41 ) . 
The Defendants have no argument with either find-
ing. 
The Court then went on to state: If not withstanding 
the agreement, many years go by without fault of the 
Seller, if you can find such a line of authorities, we11 
charge Bott interest by way of rental. 
Briefs were accordingly submitted. The Judge stated 
at the hearing that he was of the frame of mind that Mr. 
Bott shouldn't have possession of the ground for all that 
period and have the use of the money for all that time as 
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shocking the conscience (T 47), and held that the De-
fendants were entitled to interest from the date of Plain-
tiff's possession. The Court declined to charge interest 
beyond the time Mr. Reeder first brought the matter of 
the quiet title into Court ( T 44). Counsel for Defendants, 
in an effort to cooperate with the Judge in this decision, 
attempted to help fix the date of the first hearing. 
At a later hearing the Court reversed himself and 
decided that Defendants were not entitled to any interest. 
So far as Defendants can determine this change of 
mind on the part of the Court was brought about by a 
re-consideration of the record wherein Mr. Reeder testi-
fied as follows: ( T 14). 
Q. And what was said concerning the purchase 
price? 
A. Well, I told him what the purchase price would 
be. 
Q. Four thousand dollars? 
A. That's right. With a forty acre water right. 
Q. Forty acre water right. When was he to pay 
you the $4,000? 
A. Well, when we got the deed with title. 
Q. And he hasn't got it yet? 
A. No. 
Q. So that the $4,000 isn't due until you deliver 
him title? 
A. That's right. 
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The Court in its final decision stated ( T 61), "I 
wanted to say in the record that Mr. Reeder in his testi-
mony stated that he wanted no more than the amount 
due~ and the reporter couldn't find anything in the record 
to show me that Reeder had ever gone to Bott and talked 
to him about an extension of time or stated that because 
of ~lr. Mason that he couldn't get the title quieted, and 
the record seems to be silent as far as Mr. Bott is con-
cerned. There was never anything said. So I subscribe 
to the doctrine of law that you presented, Miss Hansen, 
but I can't apply it here because I can't find the facts to 
justify it. I'll announce that's the law but there had to 
be something happen then and neither Reeder nor Batt 
testified to anything." 
This conclusion is not consistent with the facts nor 
with the law. The law as hereinafter quoted, confirms 
the reasonableness of Defendants claim as well as the 
right of Defendants to interest. 
STATEMENT OF POINT 
The lower Court erred in failing to grant Defendants 
the interest as prayed for in their Amended Answer and 
Counter Claim. 
ARGUMENT 
The lower Court erred in failing to grant to Defend-
ants the interest prayed for in their Amended Answer 
and Counter Claim. 
The pertinent facts to be considered, in relation to 
the law hereinafter quoted, are that there was a written 
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memorandum which was silent as to interest; and that 
there was an understanding by the parties that interest 
not to be charged until after tender of a deed, which 
understanding was based on a belief by the parties that 
title would be cleared and a deed tendered immediately. 
It is important to note that while the parties agreed 
that interest was not to be charged until after tender of 
the deed, there was no contract, or agreement, either 
written or oral, which specified there would be no interest 
charged regardless of any contingencies that might arise. 
Since the matter was already in the hands of an at-
torney for the purpose of clearing the title, it could not 
have been contemplated by the parties that a 17 year 
delay would ensue. 
There is a long quotation in American Jurisprudence 
which Defendants feel is an excellent review of the law 
in this type of case, and which we quote for the con-
venience of the Court: 
"A disti.t"'lction has been made between the right 
of the vendor to interest upon the u:Dpaid purchase 
money at law and in equity. Where a contract pro-
vides for payment of the price and delivery of the 
deed upon a certain date and the vendor without 
excuse does not tender the deed until after such date, 
in the absence of a contractm·al provision to the 
contrary, it would seem clear that there is at law 
no right to interest upon the unpaid purchase money 
for any period before the deed is tendered by the 
vendor, because at law the vendor's right to the 
principal does not mature until the vendee is put in 
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default by a due tender of the deed. But when 
asked to enforce an agreement of this character, 
equity proceeds with reference not only to the rights 
of the parties under the agreement, but also with 
reference to the position the parties assume to each 
other after making the agreement, and the equities 
that grow out thereof. Where pending the execu-
tion of an agreetnent for the sale of land which does 
not provide for possession of the land, the vendee 
takes possession of the land, a court of equity ordi-
narily \viii charge interest upon the unpaid pur-
chase money. This is true although there is a delay 
in the execution of the contract of sale by the vendor. 
In equity the vendor is ordinarily entitled to interest 
tvhere the purchaser is let into possession and no 
provision is rrULde in the contract for a delay in the 
execut-ion, although the failure to complete the con-
tract is due to the fault of the vendor, and in such 
a case in decreeing specific performance the pur-
chaser is ~ a general rule to be charged with interest 
on the purchase money from the time it should have 
been paid if the contract had been carried out as 
contemplated by the pa1ties, it being deemed in-
equitable that the purchaser should enjoy the bene-
fit of the possession without liability for interest." 
(Emphasis added. ) 
55 Am. Jur. Sec. 347, p. 774 
An annotation in 25 ALR 2d, commencing at Page 
951, states the general rule and digests numerous cases in 
support thereof: 
"In the absence of an express provision in a 
land contract, the allowance of interest depends upon 
the various equities of a particular situation, the 
factor of possession being one of the most important. 
It is stated generally that neither party should be 
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able to enjoy both the beneficial use of the property 
and the use of the purchase money without being 
held accountable in some manner to the other party." 
(This excerpt quoted in McDermott vs. Sher. 280 
P. 2d, 660 (N.M.) (1955) 
The Courts have confirmed the general rule stated 
in the above quotation in the following specific cases: 
"Where vendee was let into possession of a tract 
of land under an agreement that the balance of the 
purchase price thereof was not to be required of 
him until certain defects in the title had been cured, 
in holding, where he had not appropriated this un-
paid balance to the use of the vendor, that he was 
liable for interest thereon, the Court said: "The 
record presents the case of a vendor who has deliv-
ered possession of the premises to the purchaser, 
which he has continued to enjoy without molesta-
tion; of a vendor who has also faithfully complied 
with his engagement that a good title should be made 
upon the happening of a particular event, until which 
event he has left the purchase money in the hands 
of the vendee, as his security, and that vendee has 
thus, for more than 18 years, by himself, or his ven-
dee received the rents and profits, and held the 
purchase money also. Is there any principal of law 
or equity which can justify us in saying he shall keep 
both? Shall the purchaser for so long a period re-
ceive the profits while he is enjoying the interest of 
the purchase money? - for it would be wilful blind-
ness to the ordinary course of transactions to sup-
pose that this 1noney has lain idle. If raised at all, 
it has been put to interest, beyond question, if not 
raised, the interest has been saved to the party, which 
amounts to the same thing; for in either event he 
\vould have enjoyed the vendor's estate for 18 years 
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for nothing. The injustice of such a proceeding has 
long since given rise to the rule that, as to interest 
and profits, the vendor is to be considered the owner 
of the money and entitled to the interest, while the 
vendee is regarded as the owner of the land and en-
titled to the profits. But he cannot have both." 
7.5 A L R; 363 - ( Brockenbrough vs. Blythe) 
3 Leigh (va) 619 (1832). 
"It seems to be the general rule that as between 
a vendor and purchaser interest is to be allowed to 
the vendor on the purchase price where the vendee 
is given possession of the property pending any 
delay in the consumation of sale due to inability to 
promptly perfect the title, etc. But it has also been 
held that where the vendor wilfully and wrongfully 
withholds the possession and also wrongfully fails 
and refuses to consumate the sale until required 
to do so by a decree for specific performance he will 
nevertheless be allowed, in an accounting for the 
ad interim rents, interest in such amount on the un-
paid purchase price as does not exceed the amount 
of rents and income received by him, forfeiting the 
excess of interest if any." 
Bands v. Rhoads, 35 So. 2d 437; Miss. ( 1948) 
(Syllabus by the Courts: ) 
"The right in equity of a vendor to interest upon 
the unpaid purchase money is distinguished from 
such right of law. 
"At law and in the absence of a contractural 
provision to the contrary, the vendor's right to the 
purchase price does not ordinarly mature until the 
vendee is placed in default by a due and proper 
tender of deed. 
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"Equity proceeds not only with a recognition of 
the contractural rights of the parties, but also with 
an observance of the position assumed toward each 
other by the respective parties during the period of 
litigation and the equities arising therefrom. 
"In equity the vendor is ordinarily entitled to 
interest where the purchaser is let into possession and 
no provision is made in the contract for a delay in 
its execution although the failure to complete the 
contract is due to the fault of the vendor, and in such 
a case in decreeing specific performance the pur-
chaser is as a general rule to be charged with interest 
on the purchase money from the time it should have 
been paid if the contract had been carried out as con-
templated by the parties, it being deemed inequit-
able that the purchaser should enjoy the benefit of 
the possession without liability for interest." 
Volk vs. Atlantic Acceptance & Realty Co. 
59 A. 2d 387; N. J. ( 1948) 
"The trial judge held that under the contract 
plaintiff was entitled to interest on the installment 
payments after the year 1940 at the rate of 4% per 
annum. In so doing, he applied the rule in equity 
under which it is held in suits involving the enforce-
ment of contracts for the sale and purchase of real 
estate that a purchaser under an executory contract 
is under equitable obligation to pay interest upon 
the unpaid purchase price where a situation not 
covered by an express provision of the contract and 
not contemplated by the parties has arisen, as where 
the vendor delays performance to a purchaser in 
possession and payment of the purchase price is 
due at the time stipulated for the vendor's perform-
ance or where a purchaser takes possession before 
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he is entitled to it. The basis of the rule in equity 
is that it is inequitable in the first mentioned case 
that the purchaser should enjoy the use and benefit 
of both the land and the purchase money, where 
payment of the purchase money is due, without pay-
ing interest on the purchase money to compensate 
for the use of the land, and in the latter case that he 
should have possession of the land before he is 
entitled to it without paying interest to compensate 
for the possession thus taken. Hence, it is said that 
the purchaser should not have the benefit of the 
possession of the land in such cases without liability 
for interest on the purchase money. The equitable 
obligation to pay interest is imposed to adjust the 
equities of the parties where the contract itself con-
tains no provision governing the situation. 
Lund vs. Larsen; 24 N. W. 827; Minn. (1946) 
(Also cited at 25 ALR 2d 954) 
The case was not decided on this equitable principle; 
the court holding that a different rule would apply 
because of the patticular fact situation). 
"The decided trend of courts of law and courts 
of equity has been to break away from hard and fast 
rules and charge and allow interest in accordance 
with principles of equity, in order to accomplish 
justice, in each patticular case." 
Nagle Engine vs. City of Erie, 26 Erie 76. 
The New Jersey case of Kleinert vs. De Chiaro, 130 A. 
2d, 637 ( 1957), summarizes more recent cases regarding 
the principal cited: 
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"The rule in courts of equitable jurisdiction is 
that in the absence of some incompatible equity a 
purchaser in possession will be required to pay in-
terest on the unpaid portion of the purchase price. 
Volk v. Atlantic Acceptance & Realty Co., 142 N. J. 
Eq. 67, 59 A 2d 387 ( Ch. 1948 ) , and the cases there 
collected; New Jersey Highway Authority v. Renner, 
32 N.J Super. 197,201,108 A. 2d 107 (App. Div. 
1954), affirmed 18 N.J. 485, 114 A. 2d 555 (1955); 
Annotations, 75 A.L.R. 316, 325-332 (1931); 25 A.L.R. 
2d 951, 956-959 ( 1952). It has been held that this 
rule will be applied even though the delay in the 
execution of the contract of sale arises by fault of 
the vendor. Simonds v. Essex Passenger Ry. Co., 
57 N.J. Eq. 349, 353, 41 A. 682 ( Ch. 1898 ), quoted 
with approval in Volk, above, 142 N.J. Eq. at pages 
72-73, 59 A. 2d at page 391. The theory is that a 
purchaser should not be able to enjoy the use and 
profits of the land as well as the balance on the 
purchase price without paying interest on the hal-
" ance. 
In the Utah case of Farnsworth vs. Jensen et al, 217 
P. 2d, 571 ( 1950), while the fact situation is considerably 
different than that of the present case, the Court makes 
some interesting observations. There was a specific con-
tract in this case which required the payment of interest 
by the vendee and also required the vendor to clear title 
to the lands being sold. Vend or did not clear the title 
when she should have, the vendees stopped making pay-
ments under the terms of the contract and contended they 
did not owe interest during this period. 
The Court commented: 
"They admit the retention and use of the money 
after the due dates of payments and ~:et seek to avoid 
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cause appellant was dilatory in clearing title." 
This the Court held vendees could not do. 
J ndge Wolfe, in his concurring opinion reiterates the 
general rule cited in the above cases. 
"See the annotation at 75 ALR 316. It would 
be inequitable to allow the purchaser to enjoy the 
use of the land and at the same time allow him the 
use of the purchase money to the loss of the vendor." 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Appellants respectfully request that 
the Supreme Court reverse the decision of the Honorable 
Lewis Jones for the reasons and the law hereinbefore set 
forth insofar as said decision denies interest to the Appel-
lants on the balance of the purchase price due for lands 
sold by Appellants to Respondent; and that the Court de-
termine that Appellants are entitled to legal interest dur-
ing the 17 year period of time Respondent enjoyed 
possession and use of both land and the balance of the 
purchase price while Appellants were endeavoring to clear 
title to the lands sold to Respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
'\7. EUGENE HANSEN 
SHER~'IA HANSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
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